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NOTES
ARREST AT THE CASTLE: Payton v. New York
Police officers, acting with probable cause but without a war-
rant, went to the defendant's apartment to arrest him for murder.
The officers knocked on the apartment's metal door, but received no
response. They then forcefully opened the door and entered the
apartment. The defendant was not there. However, in plain view
was an incriminating .30-caliber shell casing which was seized by the
officers and later admitted into evidence at the defendant's murder
trial. The New York courts refused to suppress the shell casing,
holding that the entry was authorized by state statutes.' The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that the New York statutes
were unconstitutional, as the fourth amendment2 prohibits police of-
ficers, in the absence of exigent circumstances, from making war-
rantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to
make a felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).1
According to the express terms of the fourth amendment, the
people are to be secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
1. The applicable state statutes seemingly authorized police officers, without con-
sent, to enter private residences without a warrant and with force if necessary to make
routine felony-arrests. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 380 N.E.2d
224 (1978).
2. The pertinent language from the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution states that, "Itihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police -which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause."). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1960).
3. The companion case of Riddick v. New York involved similar circumstances.
Police officers, acting with probable cause but without a warrant, went to the defen-
dant's home to arrest him for the commission of two armed robberies. When the of-
ficers knocked on the door, defendant's young son opened it. The defendant then was
arrested as he sat in his bed. Before allowing him to dress, the officers opened a chest
of drawers near his bed and found narcotics and related drug paraphernalia. At his
trial, the seized materials were admitted into evidence against him, and he was con-
victed on narcotics charges. The trial judge held that the entry was authorized by the
revised state statute, NEw YoRK Cane. Poc. LAW § 140.16(4) (McKinney, 1974), and
that the search was reasonable under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 762 (1969). The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of the defendants Payton and
Riddick in a single opinion.
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and "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be search-
ed, and the persons or things to be seized."' When the framers of
the amendment drafted the enactment, however, they did not specify
whether warrants were necessary or which actions might make a
search or seizure "unreasonable."5 This omission can be attributed
to the fact that the drafters of the fourth amendment were primarily
concerned with the "warrant clause" of the enactment. The "war-
rant clause" was specifically drawn up to prohibit the indiscriminate
searches and seizures then being conducted under the dreaded
"writs of assistance" existing in the colonies at the time of the Revo-
lution. As originally proposed, the amendment was to be a "one-bar-
relled affair, directed apparently only to the essentials of a valid
warrant."' The original draft contained only a single clause, which
placed several restrictions on the issuance of warrants. The right of
security from "unreasonable searches and seizures" was added later
in an additional clause. When it was finally adopted, the amendment
contained two separate clauses: one clause required that warrants
be particular and supported by probable cause, while the other pro-
tected the general right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.!
As a result, the monumental task of resolving the meaning of
the ambiguous language in the amendment and of determining what
actions were to be prohibited by the "unreasonable searches and
seizures" clause was left primarily to the judiciary. Yet during the
first century following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, only a few
cases involving interpretation of the fourth amendment reached the
United States Supreme Court." During this period the limited crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the federal government was not exercised to any
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100-03 (1973). See also Comment, The Constitutionality
of Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1550, 1551 n.9 (1978) ("There is no in-
dependent legislative history of the fourth amendment establishing the framers' in-
tent as to what constitutes an 'unreasonable' search and seizure.").
6. LASSON, supra note 5. at 103. The indiscriminate searches and seizures con-
ducted under the authority of general warrants were the immediate evils which
prompted the framers of the fourth amendment to draft that particular provision. The
"general warrants" granted almost unlimited authority to law enforcement officials
and allowed them to conduct searches and seizures at virtually any time and place.
The "fourth amendment was primarily a response to the indiscriminate employment of
general writs." Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The
Eroding Protection of the Castle. 82 DICK. L. REV. 167, 169 & n.12 (1977).
7. LASSON, supra note 5, at 100-03.
8. Id. at 106.
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great extent by Congress. However, when the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States was later expanded to cover such matters as
the sale of narcotics and intoxicating liquors,' the fourth amendment
rapidly became "one of the most prominent and litigated provisions
of the Bill of Rights.""'
This increase in litigation finally gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to develop the meaning of the phrase "unreasonable
searches and seizures" within the context of the fourth amendment.
In performing this function, the Court accepted the idea that war-
rants could and should be used as a method of safeguarding fourth
amendment rights instead of being used "as a powerful tool of law
enforcement,"" as general warrants had been used at common law.
The modern system consisted of interposing a warrant requirement
between law enforcement agents and the citizens. A neutral and de-
tached magistrate could then rule on whether sufficient probable
cause existed to bring a particular search or seizure within the
directives of the fourth amendment."
While the exact historical development of this modern warrant
system is not very clear,'" the system is nevertheless now called a
"time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights,"" and
has been praised in numerous cases over the years.'" Thus, while
some commentators have stated that the warrant requirement is ac-
tually a "relatively modern concept,"" not really contemplated by
9. 1L
10. Id.
11. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608 (1980) (White, J., dissenting)
("Hence at the time of the Bill of Rights, the warrant functioned as a powerful tool of
law enforcement rather than as a protection for the rights of criminal suspects.").
12. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
13. Although the theory of interposing a neutral and detached magistrate between
law enforcement agents and the citizens has. frequently been approved of by the
courts, the actual historical basis is vague. See Comment. supra note 6, at 169 n.16.
See also Farrar, Aspects of Police Search and Seizure Without Warrant in England
and the United States, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491, 502 (1975) ("It was not until the crea-
tion of a separate police organization in the nineteenth century that it was possible to
separate the combined criminal investigatory and judicial powers which the justices
exercised during the period in which they developed the common law search
warrant.").
14. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (citing
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
15. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
16. Comment, supra note 6, at 169.
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the drafters of the amendment," it is undoubtedly now one of the
chief vehicles used to protect fourth amendment guarantees.8
Justice Jackson explained the reasoning behind this concept in the
now famous passage from Johnson v. United States:"
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those in-
ferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime .... When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent."
Once the Supreme Court fully endorsed the warrant require-
ment as a protective device, its application to searches and seizures
conducted within a party's home became fairly obvious for the "physi-
cal entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed . , "'I Not as clear, however,
was whether the Court would extend the warrant requirement to
cover certain other types of searches and seizures occurring outside
the home.
While recognizing the "unique sensitivity"' given by the federal
courts to one's reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, the
Court nevertheless realized that the physical entry of a man's home
is not the only evil against which the fourth amendment was
17. Since the fourth amendment expressly prohibits "unreasonable" rather than
"warrantless" searches and seizures, whether the framers of the amendment meant to
prohibit warrantless searches and seizures as "unreasonable" is debatable. Some com-
mentators contend that the "fourth amendment was intended only to prohibit searches
and seizures made pursuant to a 'general' warrant, a warrant that does not specifically
describe the places to be searched or things to be seized .... " Note, supra note 5, at
1550 n.6. Therefore, these commentators believe that the Supreme Court errs in con-
struing the language -of the fourth amendment as a prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 20-49 (1969), where the author states that the Supreme Court has "stood the
Fourth Amendment on its head" when reading a warrant requirement into it. See also
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 607 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
18. Comment, supra note 6. at 169.
19. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
20. ld. at 13-14.
21. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
22. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978).
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directed." Stating this proposition in Katz v. United States," the
Court held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
and added that all "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment- subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions.""
Conversely, although the Court has affirmed that the arrest of a
person is "quintessentially a seizure,"" and that arrests are species
of seizures required by the amendment to be reasonable," the Court
has not governed these "seizures" with the identical rules applicable
to seizures of property. In Gerstein v. Pugh," the Court noted this
difference in treatment:
Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by re-
quiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to
any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an in-
tolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Thus, while
the Court has expressed a preference for the use of warrants
when feasible ... it has never invalidated an arrest (supported
by probable cause) solely because the officers failed to secure a
warrant.'*
While warrantless arrests in public places had in fact been tak-
ing place from the earliest days of American independence, 1 the
practice was never actually challenged and directly faced on con-
stitutional grounds by the Supreme Court until United States v.
Watson" in 1976. In Watson, the Court stated that the necessary in-
quiry "was not whether there was a warrant or whether there was
time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the ar-
rest." Still, while the Court found that warrantless arrests in
public places based upon probable cause were indeed constitutional,
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion," limited the decision
23. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. Id at 351.
26. ISl at 357.
27. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976).
28. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
29. 420 U.S. 103 (1976).
30. Id. at 113.
31. Comment, supra, note 6, at 168.
32. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
33. Id. at 417 (construing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1969)).
34. Id. at 433 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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by stating that the Court did not on this occasion address the issue
of "whether or under what circumstances an officer must obtain a
warrant before he may lawfully enter a private place to effect an ar-
rest."" On several prior occasions, however, the Supreme Court had
referred specifically to that particular issue.
In the 1958 case of Jones v. United States," although Justice
Harlan characterized the issue of warrantless arrests in private resi-
dences as a "grave constitutional question,""7 the Court did not
resolve the issue. In Ker v. California," a 1963 case, the Court noted
in dicta that these arrests could be permissible "under certain cir-
cumstances."'" Then, in 1967, the Court established the "hot pursuit"'"
doctrine in Warden v. Hayden" and justified the policemen's entry
into a suspect's home for the purpose of making a warrantless ar-
rest. Yet, at the same time, the Court failed to mention whether the
arrest would have been valid absent the particular "exigent cir-
cumstances" existing in that case. Nevertheless, four years later in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire'" the Court emphasized that the
Warden case "certainly stands by negative implication for the prop-
osition that an arrest warrant is required in the absence of exigent
circumstances."'" The Coolidge Court added that the "warrantless
entry of a man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause ...
is in fundamental conflict with . . . basic principles of Fourth
Amendment law,"" and that the practice, if allowed, would "simply ...
read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution."'" Despite this
strong language, the Court found it "unnecessary to decide the ques-
tion,"" and the statements were therefore merely dicta. In 1972 the
Court once again had the opportunity to resolve the issue in John-
35. Id. (emphasis addedi. The arrest in Watson was made upon probable cause in
a public place in broad daylight.
3. 857 U.S. 493 (1958).
87. Id at 499.
88. 874 U.S. 23 (1963).
39. Id. at 38.
40. This doctrine states that policemen in "hot pursuit" of a suspect may validly
enter a private residence, without a warrant, to arrest a suspect whom they believe
has entered the premises. "Hot pursuit" is therefore one of the "exigent circum-
tanee" which allow police officers to dispense with the warrant requirement. The
doctrine Is based on the "need to act quickly." See United States v. Santana. 427 U.S.
88. 41-42 (1976).
41. 887 U.S. 294 (1967).
42. 403 U.. 448 (1971).
48. Id at 48081.
44. Id at 477-78.
4 . Id at 480.
4L 1 at 481.
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son v. Louisiana," but instead held that the "validity of Johnson's
arrest" was "beside the point" because "no evidence that might prop-
erly be characterized as the fruit of an illegal entry and arrest was
used against him at his trial."" Finally, in 1976 the Court once again
seemed destined to decide the issue of warrantless home arrests in
United States v. Santana." The suspect, standing in the doorway of
her home, attempted to retreat into her house when officers ap-
proached to arrest her. The Court, once again skirting the issue,
held that the doorway to Santana's home was a "public place" and
that her retreat into the house did not "defeat an arrest which had
been set in motion in a public place .... "0
As a result of the preceding cases, the Supreme Court was still
evading the issue of warrantless home arrests at the beginning of
1980. But during that same period, a number of lower American
courts were forming definite and sometimes contrasting opinions on
the subject.' Of the seven United States Courts of Appeals that con-
fronted the issue, five agreed that these warrantless home arrests
were unconstitutional,"2 while two believed that they were "reason-
able" within the terms of the fourth amendment." Of the state
courts of last resort, ten of the twelve that addressed the issue held
that unless special circumstances were present, warrantless arrests
in the home were unconstitutional." Two of these state courts, how-
47. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
48. Id. at 365.
49. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
60. Id. at 43.
51. The early American cases unanimously accepted the proposition that officers
could, without warrants, break into a dwelling to make arrests. The early Massachu-
setts case of Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281 (1850). typified those cases. However, in
1949, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, in Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d
456 (D.C. Cir. 1949), provided the initial break from the earlier decisions by holding
that a warrantless home arrest was improper in the absence of some type of emergency.
Since that time, a true split has grown in the lower courts concerning the issue: See
Comment. supra note 6. at 168-71.
52. See United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 918 (1978); United States v. Kille-
brew, 560 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1977); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
63. See United States v. Williams. 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex
tel. Wright v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1970).
64. See State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877 (1977): People v. Ramey, 16
Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 133, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (19761: People
v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971). State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764, 594 P.2d 201 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); State v. Olson, 287 Or.
157, 598 P.2d 670 (1979); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2 1177, cert.
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ever, rejected the constitutional attacks. Among those rejecting the
warrant requirement were the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Perez' and the New York Court of Appeals in the present case."
In the instant case, the United States Supreme Court held for
the first time that the fourth amendment prohibits police from mak-
ing a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony-arrest.51 The defendant's conviction
was reversed, for even though the officers had relied in good faith
upon a state statute which seemed to authorize such a procedure,
the trial judge had committed reversible error by improperly refus-
ing to suppress the evidence that had been seized upon the entry."
denied, 446 U.S. 912 (1980); State v. McNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1978); Laasch v.
State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978).
While Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure article 213 seemingly authorizes war-
rantless home arrests based upon probable cause, dicta in the case of State v. Ranker,
343 So. 2d 189 (La. 1977), implied that a good possibility existed that such arrests
would later be found unconstitutional.
55. 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
66. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 380 N.E.2d 224 (1978).
57. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
58. In the recent case of Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), officers had
arrested the defendant under a "refusal to identify oneself" ordinance. Id. at 33.
A search incident to that arrest revealed that the defendant was in illegal possession
of a controlled substance. The defendant was never charged with a violation of the or-
dinance for which he was arrested, but he was convicted on charges of possession. The
Supreme Court assumed that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, but upheld
the conviction for possession because the invalidity of the ordinance did not affect the
validity of the defendant's arrest. Probable cause existed for the arrest and the search
was incident to that arrest; therefore, the evidence was admissible against the defen-
dant. The Court stressed that an officer is not required to anticipate that a court will.
later hold a statute unconstitutional, unless the law is "so grossly and flagrantly un-
constitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its
flaws." Id. at 38.
The officers in Payton were likewise relying on a statute which had not yet been
found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Payton is, however,
distinguishable from Michigan v. DeFiUippo. In DeFiUippo, the arrest was valid
because none of the procedures used in making the arrest were violative of the Consti-
tution. Therefore, even though the statute outlining the underlying crime was later
found to be unconstitutionally vague, the arrest itself was still constitutionally valid.
The evidence obtained from the search incident to that arrest was therefore admissible
against the defendant when he was later tried for another crime. On the other hand, in
Payton it was the procedural statute authorizing warrantless home arrests which was
later found to be unconstitutional. Therefore, because the procedure used to arrest the
defendant was unconstitutional, the arrest itself was also unconstitutional. As a result.
the evidence obtained in the search incident to that invalid arrest should have been ex-
cluded at trial, despite the good faith actions of the officers. For another recent case
dealing with the good faith of police officers and its effect on the admissibility of
evidence at trial, see United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied., 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
The case was therefore remanded "for further proceedings not in-
consistent with" the Court's ruling.59
Since the Court had never directly faced this particular issue
prior to Payton, the Court had to base its decision primarily on
"rules that [had become] well established in [earlier) Fourth Amend-
ment litigation involving tangible items.""u The Court saw no prob-
lem, however, in applying these rules to the present case, since the
"simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures of
persons and to seizures of property.""1
The Court reasoned that since arrests are "seizures" required
by the fourth amendment to be reasonable, "any differences in the
intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely
ones of degree rather than kind."" Recognizing that both types of
intrusions "breach ...the entrance to an individual's home,"" the
Court concluded that the "basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law"-that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively un-
reasonableu-"has equal force when the seizure of a person is in-
volved."6 The Court explained this position further in the following
passage:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a
variety of settings. In none of these is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in
clear and specific constitutional terms: "The right of the people
to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.". . . In
terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures
or persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
59. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 578, 603 (1980).
60. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 589.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 686 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447-78 (1971),
where the Court stated that it is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrant are per 8e unreasonable In
the absence of some one of a number of well defined 'exigent circumstances.'").
65. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 578, 587 (1980). See aLeo the following two
cases upon which the Court relied heavily: United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412. 428 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 918 (1978) ("To be arrested in the home involves not only
the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home.
This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant ... ."h Dorman v.
United States, 485 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (An entry to arrest and an entry to search
for and to seize property violate the same interest in preserving the privacy and san-
tity of the home: therefore, they deserve the same level of constitutional prot)ctim)
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entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."
The Court openly rejected New York's argument that the
reasons which supported the holding in United States v. Watson"
required a similar result in the instant case." In Watson, the Court
relied on (a) the well-settled common-law rule that a warrantless ar-
rest in a public place was valid if probable cause existed, (b) the
overwhelming approval of this common-law rule by the states, and
(c) the expression of Congressional judgment, through federal
statutes, that such an arrest was "reasonable.""
Conversely, in Payton the Court found that none of the above
mentioned reasons for upholding warrantless arrests in public places
were applicable to warrantless invasions of privacy in the home."
First of all, the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests was
not nearly as clear as the common-law rule on arrests in public
places.' Second, while a majority of the states had indeed permitted
warrantless home arrests (even in the absence of any exigency), a
declining trend was noted in this practice. 2 And finally, unlike the
situation in Watson, no federal statute was cited in Payton to in-
dicate any congressional determination that warrantless home ar-
rests were "reasonable.""
The Payton majority also rejected New York's contention that
the warrant requirement for home arrests would constitute an un-
due hardship on effective law enforcement practices.' Since no evi-
66. 445 U.S. at 589-90.
67. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
68. 445 U.S. at 590.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 591.
71. Id. at 592. The Court found that, unlike the situation in Watson, at common
law a "surprising lack of judicial decisions and a deep divergence among scholars" ex-
isted on the question of warrantless home arrests. Lords Coke, Burn, Foster, Hawkins,
East, and Russell all took the view that a warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest
was illegal, while Blackstone, Chitty. and Stephen took the opposite view. However,
noting "the prominence of Lord Coke" the Court stated that "the weight of authority
as it appeared to the Framers was to the effect that a warrant was required, or at the
minimum that there were substantial risks in proceeding without one." Id. at 596.
72. Id. at 599. The Court noted that while twenty-four states permitted war-
rantless home arrests by statute and only fifteen states prohibited them, the "current
figures reflect a significant decline during the last decade in the number of States per-
mitting warrantless entries for arrest." The Court went on to add that "[vlirtually all
of the state courts that . .. [have considered the question) have held warrantless en-
tries into the home to arrest to be invalid in the absence of exigent circumstances." Id.
73. Id. at 601.
74. Id. at 602.
dence was brought before the Court showing that "effective law en-
forcement has suffered in those States that already have such a re-
quirement,"75 the Court viewed this argument with "skepticism,"
and noted that "such arguments of policy must give way to a con-
stitutional command that we consider to be unequivocal.""
In response to the state's suggestion that "only. a search war-
rant based on probable cause to believe a suspect is at home .. can
adequately protect the privacy interests at stake,"" the Court
stated that while an arrest warrant requirement may afford less
protection than a search warrant requirement, the arrest warrant
would nevertheless be sufficient for fourth amendment purposes.
The arrest warrant requirement still interposes a neutral magis-
trate between the police and the public, and "Ji]f there is sufficient
evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a judicial
officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to
require him to open his doors to the officers of the law.""8
In addition, the majority emphasized that it was pttting to one
side several related problems which were not before 'the Court."
First, the Court noted that it had "no occasion to consider the sort
of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'ex-
igent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a
home for the purpose of either arrest or search."' Second, the case
did not present any questions "concerning the authority of the
police, without either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third
party's home to arrest a suspect."8'
Despite the limitations placed upon Payton by the Court. the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The state suggested that only a search warrant would be sufficient to pro-
tect the interests at stake, and "since such a warrant requirement is manifestly im-
practical, there need be no warrant of any kind." The Court. however, found this "in-
genious argument" unpersuasive. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 583.
80. Id. The Court therefore cast no doubt on either United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976) (where the Court held that police may enter a premises without a war-
rant to arrest a person who sought refuge therein after seeing the police approach), or
on Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (where the police entered a premises
without a warrant in "hot pursuit" of a suspect).
81. Id. However, several of these questions were resolved in the recent Supreme
Court decision of Steagald v. United States 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981), where the Court
held that absent exigent circumstances or consent, a.law enforcement officer may not
legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without
first getting a search warrant, but that an arrest warrant alone is sufficient to enter a
suspect's own residence to arrest him.
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decision still stands as a landmark case in the field of criminal law.
The opinion lays to rest a conflict which had existed in the lower
courts for years and demands that individuals be given certain pro-
tections never before guaranteed to them by the Supreme Court
under the fourth amendment.
The Court's logic is comprehended easily. The majority simply
recognized that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which ...the Fourth Amendment is directed,"" and that
"[t]he simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures
of persons and to seizures of property."" Therefore, since "[lit is a
'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and sei-
zures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreason-
able,"" arrests in a home without a warrant are also presumptively
unreasonable."5
The Court's rejection of the proposition that a substantial dif-
ference exists between the intrusiveness of an entry to search for
property and an entry to search for a person"m also appears proper.
Both entries deal with breaching what is "[a]t the very core" of the
Fourth Amendment-"the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.' 'm
In dissent Justice White stated that "a front door arrest ... is no
more intrusive on personal privacy than the public warrantless ar-
rests which we found to pass constitutional muster in Watson.""
However, this argument totally disregards the "unique sensitivity"
given to "one's reasonable expectation of privacy in the home"" and
fails to recognize that not one but two invasions of privacy take
place when home arrests are involved: "To be arrested in the home
involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an in-
vasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an
invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of ex-
igent circumstances . ... "10
The minority's statement that law enforcement would be "se-
82. Id. at 585 (quoting United States. v United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
(1972)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)).
85. Id. at 588.
86, Id. at 589.
87. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1960)).
88. Id. at 617.
89. See note 22, supra, and accompanying text.
90. Id. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir.), cert
denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978)).
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verely hamper[edr" seems to be without substance. Justice Stevens'
majority opinion specifically stated that the Court had "no occasion
to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation ...that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of
either arrest or search."" Therefore, since the exceptions to allow-
ing warrantless home arrests which were previously expounded by
the Supreme Court" still remain valid, Justice White's concern "that
a dangerous criminal will escape into the community"" is without
constitutional merit. A situation dealing with a "dangerous criminal"
suspected of a recent, violent crime would probably create sufficient
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home arrest, or at
least would justify a "stake out" until the suspect left his home or
until a warrant was obtained.
Finally, the dissent's contention that "Itihe policeman on his beat
must now make subtle discriminations that perplex even judges in
their chambers""' is in no way supportive of warrantless home ar-
rests. Police were already being asked to determine whether prob-
able cause existed in cases of this type. The decision of whether "ex-
igent circumstances" exist is similar to determining whether prob-
able cause exists. To say that officers are competent to make one of
these decisions but that they are not competent to make the other
would be inconsistent. Policemen, therefore, should be given the
power to make both of these decisions, or warrantless arrests
should be done away with altogether.
The latter proposal is not a wise one, for valid reasons exist for
allowing warrantless arrests in public places; some degree of "ex-
igency" occurs with almost every arrest made in a public place. The
danger that the suspect will not be sighted again and that he will
escape before a warrant can be obtained is often present in cases of
this nature. However, this danger is not present to the same degree
when a suspect is in his home. If probable cause exists, the police
can protect society's interest by arresting the suspect if he attempts
to leave the premises before the warrant is procured or by entering
the premises if exigent circumstances call for such action.
Granted, new techniques are needed to halt the spiraling in-
crease in crime. However, the privacy rights of our citizens should
not be sacrificed unless some purposeful advantage is given to our
91. Id. at 618.
92. Id. at 583.
93. See notes 41 & 49. supra. and accompanying text.
94. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 583, 619 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 618-19 (White, J.. dissenting).
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law enforcement officials. From this standpoint, the Payton decision
appears very sound indeed, for it grants individuals protections
guaranteed by the Constitution and, at the same time, gives society
the protection it needs in a time of greatly increasing crime.
Paul E. Brown
MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT:
THE EFFECT ON RECOVERY OF AN OBLIGOR'S
BAD FAITH
After hearing a strange noise emanating from his automobile
engine, the plaintiff delivered his automobile, a Mercedes, to the de-
fendant for repair. The defendant claimed to have corrected the
problem, but the engine produced a louder and more disturbing
sound when the plaintiff reclaimed his vehicle. Immediate attempts
by the defendant to locate the source of the new sound were unsuc-
cessful; consequently, the plaintiff was required to leave the car for
additional repair. The defendant's failure to repair various defects
eventually resulted in the plaintiff's being stranded on three sepa-
rate occasions.' The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of duty
to repair and was awarded $500 in non-itemized damages by the dis-
trict court. On appeal, the defendant argued that the portion of the
award evidently representing recovery of "moral damages"' under
1. The Court stated:
The unfortunate part of these episodes is that, after each attempt at repairs,
plaintiff's car broke down on the road, leaving him stranded on one occasion on
Downman Road near the Lakefront Airport in New Orleans, once on Interstate 10
Highway in the swamp area past LaPlace and once on the Lake Pontchartrain
Causeway. On each of these occasions, plaintiff and his companions had to arrange
for an alternate method of returning home and plaintiff had to have the vehicle
towed to the defendant's for repairs.
Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., 383 So. 2d 416. 417 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
2. Moral damages, commonly known as nonpecuniary damages, may be defined
as damages that repair prejudice to one's emotional equanimity. Since the $500 award
by the district court was not itemized, proving that the award included any moral
damages is difficult, although this fact was implied by the district court judge. Reasons
for Judgment, Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., No. 77-14342 (Dist. Ct. Orl. La.
1979). Moreover, on appeal both the plaintiff and the defendant assumed that moral
damages had been awarded. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Stephens Imports, Inc. at 6,
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Coddington at 6, Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., 383
So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 42
